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PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS IN PRODUCT LIABILITY
LITIGATION: STRONG MEDICINE OR POISON PILL?
INTRODUCTION
Punitive Damages: Through the Five Prisms
AARON D. TwERSKI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tfhe role of an introduction to a symposium is awkward at best.
Some introductions merely set forth a brief synopsis of the posi-
tions taken by the various contributors. That hardly seems worth
the effort. Others attempt to comment on the various articles and
to provide a hasty critique. That, however, is unfair. Like a boxer
who lands a jab and runs for cover, a hasty critique is more of an
annoyance than a body blow. It demonstrates that the reviewer has
read the articles and is at least moderately intelligent; but that
hardly serves as a justification for taking the reader's time. Having
eschewed these models, my introductory remarks instead, will re-
flect on aspects of punitive damages that were not touched on by
the participants to this most interesting symposium that I believe
are worthy of some consideration. Because my field of special inter-
est is products liability, and the formal topic of the symposium fea-
tures "design defect" liability as the focus for the discussion of
punitive damages, my remarks will be heavily, though not exclu-
sively, directed toward that topic.
II. FROM THE PRISM OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Generally speaking, punitive damages pick up where compen-
satory damages leave off. As such, the argument that punitive dam-
ages supplement the standard package of compensatory damages
has merit. Not all forms of suffering are compensable,' and attor-
neys' fees generally reduce a plaintiff's recovery by one-third.2
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B., 1962, Beth Medrash Elyon
Research Institute; B.S., 1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D., 1965, Mar-
quette University.
1. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform,
39 VILL. L. REv. 363, 378-79 (1994). Intangible harm, such as loss of interpersonal
relationships and missed opportunity, are not compensable under the rules of
compensatory damage liability. Id.
2. Id. at 379.
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Nonetheless, punitive damages are supposed to impose retribution
in a measure not accomplished by compensatory damages. 3
My difficulty with this subject is that there is no decent jurispru-
dence that informs the courts as to what standards should govern
the most important element of compensatory damages - that of
pain and suffering.4 One looks in vain at the decided cases to find
anything resembling a judicial standard for evaluation of non-eco-
nomic damages. Currently, the best answer seems to be that dam-
ages are excessive when they "shock the judicial conscience." 5
Borrowing from Mr. Justice Jackson's famous dicta in Williams v.
North Carolina,6 billions of dollars are transferred in our tort system
utilizing standards that would not pass scrutiny if they were used for
the collection of a grocery bill.7 In another forum, Professor Hen-
derson and I observed a steady downward trend in damages., Leg-
islative caps on non-economic damages, limits on joint and several
liability and other damage limitation forms have taken hold.9 How-
ever, to the extent that these doctrines serve as surrogates for sensi-
ble damage jurisprudence, they are draconian in nature and always
assume a one-sided quality.10
Academics have almost single-mindedly focused on liability
3. Jim Fieweger, Note, The Need for Reform of Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Liti-
gation:Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 775, 777 (1990); see,
e.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1980) (recognizing that
punitive damages are not meant to compensate, but to punish and deter); cf.
Owen, supra note 1, at 374-75, 377-78 (suggesting that punitive damages serve edu-
cational and law enforcement functions).
4. Frederick S. Levin, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for Damages Measure-
ment "Anomie", 22 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 303 (1989). The lack ofjudicial standards for
measuring pain and suffering have resulted in a variety of pain and suffering
awards, leaving one to wonder what justifies such disparity. Id. at 303.
5. Precopio v. City of Detroit, 330 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Mich. 1982).
6. 317 U.S. 287, 316 (1942) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
7. James A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of Ameri-
can Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1332, 1339-40 (1991). Standards assess-
ing whether damages are excessive have been vague. Id. at 1339 n.40 (listing cases
and commentary that judicial standards are vague).
8. Id. at 1340 (discussing restrictions on punitive damages).
9. Id. at 1340 n.43; see also JAMEs A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TwERsKi, PROD-
ucrs LtAB.nIL-: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 302 (2d ed. 1991) (listing relevant statutes
that limit scope of punitive damages). Joint and several tortfeasor recovery is now
a minority rule in the United States. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1340
n.49.
10. Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response
to the Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1225 (1989). State legislatures have adopted
limitations on joint and several liability because of two main concerns. Id. at 1332.
First, the doctrine "exponentially multiplies" the inherent unfairness of tort liabil-
ity. Id. Second, state legislatures have recognized that the problem of liability was
more serious than the reallocation of losses from insolvent defendants who were
unable to pay their "fair share." Id.
[Vol. 39: p. 353
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doctrine. They find it enjoyable to debate the theories of liability.
Damages, for the most part, have been considered too pedestrian to
merit the attention of serious scholars. It is a subject to be left to a
course entitled Ambulance Chasing 101. Moreover, courts that left
without a compass have fallen back on an empty verbalization as the
standard for judicial review. Without a tolerable jurisprudence of
damages, the distinction between "punitive" and "compensatory"
has become blurred.11 The reality is that the subject of tort dam-
ages is worthy of intense academic and judicial inquiry. It is a pub-
lic law question of the first order. Until tort damages are examined
in all their detail, a comprehensive evaluation of punitive damages
will be impossible.
III. FROM THE PRISM OF INTENT
Most design defect cases are essentially intentional tort cases.
Very few cases today result from "inadvertent design errors."' 2
Cases where manufacturers simply fail to adequately design a prod-
uct for its normal intended use are rare.' 3 Although such cases ex-
isted in the early days of product liability law, few sophisticated
manufacturers in the modern era make such egregious errors. The
cases that fill the reporters today are "conscious design choice"
cases, all of which implicate a manufacturer's decisionmaking pro-
cess concerning risk-utility.' 4 Manufacturers engaging in risk-utility
balancing are charged with doing so improperly. In these cases,
plaintiffs allege that had the defendant-manufacturers properly as-
sessed risk and utility, such manufacturers would have been able to
implement a reasonable alternative design and would have avoided
11. Sheila Birnbaum, Remarks at the Villanova Law Review Symposium: Puni-
tive Damages Awards in Product Liability Litigation: Strong Medicine or Poison
Pill? (Oct. 30, 1993) (transcript on file with the Villanova Law Review). Birnbaum
asserts that large punitive damage awards interfere with the goal of compensation
and should only be awarded once. Id. Punitive damages are not necessary for
deterrence purposes because the threat of mass litigation and the potential for
insolvency function as deterrents. Id.
12. The frequency of inadvertent, design errors is greatly reduced today as a
result of the emphasis on product safety. It is well recognized that such cases are a
small percentage of all products liability cases.
13. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1550 n.70 (1973) (esti-
mating that inadvertent design errors constituted 20-25% of researched cases).
14. Id. at 1548. The design engineer consciously decides to accept the risks
associated with the intended design in exchange for the increased benefits or re-
duced costs which justify acceptance of the risks. Id.; see, e.g., Owens v. Allis-
Chumbers, 326 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Mich. 1982) (focusing upon availability of safety
option in determining whether option should have been installed as standard
equipment).
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plaintiffs' injuries. 15 Manufacturers classically defend these cases by
arguing that the alternatives suggested could not have been
adopted at an acceptable cost.16 They claim that an alternative
would have negatively affected the usefulness of the product or
would have otherwise imposed such increases in costs as to prohibit
the product's implementation. 17 The authority supporting risk-util-
ity balancing as the governing test for design defect is overwhelm-
ing.' 8 In many jurisdictions, it is the law.' 9
A defendant whose product is found non-defective because it
meets the risk-utility test has no worry. However, if a tribunal finds
that risk-utility norms have not been met, the defendant is in deep
trouble. By definition, risk-utility balancing requires a conscious
weighing of alternative designs against the cost of implementing
such changes. 20 Unlike the standard negligence case of yesteryear,
the modern products liability case comes with "intent" built in.2'
Admittedly, most product design cases do not meet the thresh-
old of grossly negligent or wanton conduct necessary to make out a
case for punitive damages. 22 Yet, the threat lurks in the back-
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c, at 16 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
Apr. 1994)) [hereinafter THIO RESTATEMENT]. The plaintiff must prove that
adoption of a reasonable alternative design would have reduced the foreseeable
risk of harm. Id. The risk-utility test is analyzed using an objective standard. Id.
16. Id. § 2 cmt. c, at 48. If there was no practical alternative design at the time
of sale, the product is not deemed defective. For a list of cases holding that a
product is not defective because there was not an available alternate feasible de-
sign, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c, at 48-49.
17. Id. § 2 cmt. d, at 19. In determining whether the failure to adopt a pro-
posed alternative design renders a product defective, the effects of the implemen-
tation of the alternative design on product function and costs of production are
relevant factors to be considered. Id.
18. See id. § 2 cmt. c., at 39 (listing cases that relied upon risk-utility analysis in
determining whether product was defective).
19. Id. at 39. An overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions use the
risk-utility test. Id.
20. Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Products Liability Bill:
Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 575, 611 (1985).
21. David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers
of Defective Products, 49 U. CHIC. L. REv. 1, 21 (1982) (noting that courts have cho-
sen to apply more traditional standards of liability such as consciousness, willful-
ness, maliciousness, wantonness and recklessness).
22. S. REP. No. 203, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1993) (stating that "punitive
damages are not a significant factor in product liability cases"). This report noted
that, as Professor Eisenberg testified to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation, "[t]here is a widespread perception that punitive dam-
ages are awarded frequently and in great amounts [in product liability cases]. Yet,
every serious study of the area finds that punitive damage awards are relatively
infrequent.... [P]unitive damages are awarded in not more than one percent of
filed cases." Id. (quoting Testimony of Professor Theodore Eisenberg, Cornell Law
School, Responses to Post-hearing questions of Senator Rockefeller, at 4-6).
356 [Vol. 39: p. 353
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ground. This does not speak for the abolition of punitive damages.
It does mean, however, that well articulated standards-for punitive
damages are necessary and courts must consistently apply them. It
is no answer to say that ultimately imprudent punitive damage
awards get reversed or drastically reduced.23 A loose canon is one
thing; a loose hydrogen bomb is quite another. It is too scary a
weapon to brandish improperly. If punitive damages are to be
saved, courts at both the trial and appellate levels will have to treat
them with greater respect.
IV. FROM THE PRISM OF TIME
The time dimension in products liability law affects punitive
damages in several ways. First, the culprits guilty of truly wanton
conduct are rarely around to suffer the sting when punitive dam-
ages are. assessed. 24 If they have not passed on to their heavenly
reward (or its opposite), they are usually not around to suffer the
indignities and whatever corporate censure is appropriate for
malfeasors. Even if such culprits are still in existence, the financial
burdendoes not fall upon them individually. I do not find it easy at
all to understand why innocent purchasers of stock should have
their life savings diminished to punish the misdeeds of corporate
executives who have retired to the Riviera. It is one thing to com-
pensate out of corporate assets, it is quite another to punish the
innocent-especially when the truly guilty avoid all liability.
Commentators have~noted that executives are prone to short-
term high-profit decisions and are willing to let others face the con-
sequences years later.25 If that observation is true, how does one
23. See Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1391 (3d Cir.) (reducing punitive dam-
age award from $2 million to $1 million due to effect of successive punitive dam-
age awards in asbestos litigation), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993); see also
Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581; 586 (8th Cir."1981) (reducing punitive
damages award because'it was "irrational and excessive")'.
24. See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 512 A.2d 466,' 476 (N.J. 1986)
(noting that "although the responsible management personnel may escape pun-
ishment, the corporation itself will not," and that goal of deterrance is served re-
gardless of change of personnel); Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463, So.
2d 242, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (dismissing corporation's argument that
punitive damage award would only punish current management who had nothing
to do with wrongdoing because, "a corporate entity continues to be liable for its
past tortious acts, regardless of any change in its ownership, its directors, or the
personnel through whom it acts").
25. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bank-
ruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 710-
11 (1985) (noting that corporations operating without insurance make substantial
profit during 'accident-free period). Schwartz asserts that firms operating without
1994]
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effectively deter such conduct? Taking it out on the whipping boy
may assuage some primitive feeling of anger, but it is hardly civi-
lized behavior. More attention will have to be paid to direct crimi-
nal sanctions for the more outrageous forms of corporate
behavior.26 When people or corporate entities malevolently with-
hold information or falsify test results, they should be prosecuted;
as should those who act with complicity to conceal the truth. Once
again, it is no answer to say that, to date, there has been little activ-
ity in that direction. If a message has to be sent, it should be ad-
dressed to the right party.
Care must also be taken to ensure that our sense of outrage
reflects the social values existing at the time the outrageous or wan-
ton conduct took place. Many of the cases in which punitive de-
mands have been made involve toxic torts, where injuries arise after
long latency periods.27 In these circumstances, judges and juries
should not blindly apply contemporary attitudes toward safety to
risk-utility decisions made over twenty years ago;28 finding conduct
that at the time was simply negligent to be wanton and grossly negli-
gent. Citizens cannot, of course, divest themselves entirely of our
present day cultural attitudes, but if society seeks to punish for ma-
levolence it had best be sure not to try these cases with new found
religion.
insurance will be forced to dissolve when faced with large uninsured liabilities. Id.
at 711.
26. See W. Allen Spurgeon & Terence P. Fagan, Criminal Liability for Life-En-
dangering Corporate Conduct, 72J. CaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 400 (1981) (suggesting
that criminal sanctions may deter corporations from participating in harmful con-
duct); see also E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Miscon-
duct, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1053, 1060 (1989) (asserting that criminal sanctions against
individual corporate employees responsible for wrongful decisions may be effective
in deterring outrageous misconduct).
27. Toxic tort cases dealing with asbestos and Agent Orange were coupled
with demands for punitive damages. See e.g., Fischer v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
512 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1986) (upholding award of punitive damages in asbestos mass-
tort litigation occurring years after exposure to asbestos); Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co.,
781 F. Supp. 902, 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (affirming $180 million settlement to class
members for injuries resulting from exposure to Agent Orange during Vietnam
War). For a thorough analysis of the Agent Orange litigation and settlement deci-
sion, see PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN
THE COURTS (1986).
28. See, e.g., HENDERSON & TwERsvi, supra note 9, at 622-24 (recognizing in-
creased public sensitivity towards product-related risks as result of 1960's Nader
Revolution). See generally M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKv, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ES-
SAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982) (sug-
gesting that society's attention to certain risks are culturally determined and often
unrelated to true magnitude of problem).
[Vol. 39: p. 353
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V. FROM THE PRISM OF EXPERIENCE
My own experience leads me to believe that punitive damages
do play a deterrent role, albeit in a set of cases very different from
those that have received notoriety. Manufacturers of products that
have low utility and moderate risk attached to their use are deeply
concerned with the possible impact of punitive damages.2 9 In many
instances, the products are faddish and hold the potential for enor-
mous short-range profits. Frankly, these manufacturers are quite
willing to take their chances with compensatory damages. From
their perspective, the possible range of damage is not sufficiently
high to warrant the adoption of more stringent safety features. 30
The specter of punitive damages gives'them pause.
Manufacturers of products that have substantial risk and high
utility are probably less affected by punitive damages in their deci-
sion making. 31 These manufacturers are fully aware of the enor-
mous impact that compensatory damages will have upon poor risk-
utility decisions. Thus, the punitive damages threat 'may be di-
rected against the wrong class of manufacturers, while having its
maximum impact on the decisionmaking of manufacturers whose
products never see the light of day.
VI. FROM THE PRISM OF MORALITY
Though the twin goals of deterrence and retribution provide
some support for the imposition of punitive damages, it is difficult
to counter the critics who argue that punitive damages do not pro-
vide adequate grounds for recovery in mass tort cases. 32 I believe,
29. The observation with regard to products liability is that of the author,
taken from personal experience. A close analogy can be drawn to cases that
awarded punitive damages for contract and business losses, where punitive dam-
ages had a powerful deterrent effect because compensatory damages were low
enough to have been an acceptable risk for the defendant to take. See e.g., TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718 (1993) (upholding
$10 million punitive damages award in slander of title action, which was 526 times
greater than $19,000 compensatory damages awarded by jury); Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991) (finding punitive damages award
against insurer, that was four times amount of compensatory damages and more
than two hundred times out-of-pocket expenses of insured, to be constitutional).
30. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 21, at 16 (noting difficulty in determining cul-
pability of automobile manufacturer because use of high-utility product will result
in death regardless of intentional design).
31. See Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of
the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REv. 919,
934 (1989) (recognizing that after estimation of compensatory damages, there re-
mains no incentive to use defective model).
32. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mass Torts and Punitive Damages: A Comment, 39 VILL.
L. REv. 415, 418-19 (1994) (suggesting that punitive damages are unnecessary to
1994]
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however, that tort law in: this country plays another role. It is
uniquely American. A mass tort case is a passion or morality play.
It speaks to the conscience of the country and asks whether we have
gone badly astray. It examines values and probes motives; and
when it is completed, it has a cathartic effect. 33 When courts speak
of punitive damages as reflecting a. sense of outrage, they utter an
important truth: when society bears witness to truly outrageous
conduct it must react. Swift and certainjustice is necessary not only
because it will deter future wrongdoer's, but also because it substan-
tiates society's intolerance for malevolent corporate behavior that
brings injury to thousands.
For better or worse, the American judicial theater plays a role
in our society that has no parallel in any other country. It' is not
only a place to resolve disputes, it is a dynamic and powerful organ
of creative government.3 4 When the morality play has been set
forth in all its gory detail, and when the actors have been found to
be truly malevolent, the moral conscience cannot be complacent.
It must speak out. The courthouse is the bully pulpit, and the jury
is the body politic, speaking in echo chamber voice through its rep-
resentatives. It is tempting to say, as. I did earlier, that we need to
develop criminal sanctions for the malfeasors. However, that is un-
acceptable to those who, through a lengthy trial, bore witness to
evils which they believed should not have been countenanced by
promote deterrence); Birnbaum, supra note 11 (arguing that compensatory dam-
ages effectively promote deterrence); see also Owen, supra note 1, at 389-96 (sug-
gesting that punitive damages are inappropriate remedy). Owen argues that
punitive damages are inappropriate for the following reasons: (1) the impact of
punitive damages is avoided through insurance; (2) the effect of punitive damages
is transferred to third parties through vicarious liability, governmental liability and
insurance; (3) society does not receive any monetary benefit from the plaintiff's
award; and (4) the award may result in a company's dissolution, thereby denying
future plaintiffs any recovery. Id.
33. See SCHUCK, supra note 27, at 257 (examining several meanings that Amer-
ican society placed upon Agent Orange litigation). Schuck suggests that for Amer-
ican society, the case was an effort to: (1) understand the ,Vietnam War; (2)
recognize the risks accompanied by the chemical revolution of the 1970s; and (3)
achieve justice for Vietnam veterans suffering from physical and psychological con-
ditions caused by the war. Id. at 255-57. Furthermore, the fairness hearings con-
ducted by Judge Weinstein after the finalization of the settlement expressed
society's need to assess blame and voice dissatisfaction concerning the settlement.
In Re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 857 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
34. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 96-101 (1899). The in-
volvement of the American legal system in public policy issues is unique. The part-
nership that exists between the judiciary and the legislature has been involved in a
range of controversial public policy issues including abortion, the Vietnam War,
environmental issues and nuclear energy. Id.
360 [Vol. 39: p.'353
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decent people anywhere. They are impelled to react, and punitive
damages provide the voice for their outrage.,
VII. CONCLUSION
Few commentators believe that all is well with punitive dam-
ages.35 It is not a trouble free doctrine. The doctrine is larger than
life and has withstood some powerful attacks.3 6 For all of the
trouble associated with the punitive damage doctrine, it will not go
away. Although it may be curtailed or refined at times; the doctrine
has staying power.3 7 If I am right that it serves as a voice of outrage
for the body politic, then courts have a duty to assure that only
cases that truly fit the profile of outrageousness are awarded puni-
tive damages.38 If normal risk-utility errors are allowed to serve as a
predicate for punitive damages, the morality message will be lost.
Labelling every day errors in judgment as outrageous because re-
sults turned out worse then expected is not. only unfair, but ulti-
mately waters down the moral message. The contributors to this
symposium have provoked me to think about this subject and to
35. See Fieweger, supra note 3, at 782-83 (discussing constitutional and proce-
dural problems associated with punitive damages). For a brief discussion of the
history fueling the controversy over the propriety of punitive damages, see id. at
782 n.40. Additionally, for a review of scholarly works that discuss the appropriate-
ness of punitive damages, see Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Re-
forming Punitive Damage Procedures, 69 VA. L. Rtv. 269, 269 n.1 (1983).
36. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (holding
that punitive damages are not per se unconstitutional); Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (holding that Eighth
Amendment did not apply to punitive damages in civil proceedings). For scholarly
commentary, see Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40
ALA. L. REv. 975 (1989) (arguing that procedure for determining punitive dam-
ages violates due process);John Calvin Jeffries,Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality
of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139 (1986) (arguing that repetitive punitive
damages violate due process and Eighth Amendment); Alan Howard Scheiner, Ju-
dicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury
Power, 91 COL. L. REV. 142 (1991) (arguing that discretionary nature of punitive
damages violates Seventh Amendment); Wheeler, supra note 35, at 273, 374-345
(discussing due process. challenge and Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment chal-
lenges); Thomas P. Mannion, Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 25 AK.
RON L. REv. 273 (1991) (reviewing constitutional challenges to punitive damages).
37. HENDERSON & TwERsmi, supra note 9, at 304 (noting that punitive damages
have withstood Constitutional attacks and predicting that they will "remain part of
the American tort scene").
38. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2713
(1993) (holding that $10 million punitive damage award is not so "grossly exces-
sive" as to violate due process). It was reasonable for the jury to conclude that
TXO acted in bad faith, participated in fraudulent and deceitful conduct, and
engaged in trickery. Id.; see also Owen, supra note 21, at 27 (arguing that punitive
damages are appropriate only in cases of "extreme departure from accepted safety
norms in the particular industry"). Owen argues that manufacturers must be given
leeway in making "good faith mistakes." Id.
1994]
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ponder its complexities. Read on. Read on. You will be the wiser
for it.
